A report on design and implementation of protected searchable data in IaaS by Michalas, Antonis et al.
A Report on Design and Implementation of 
Protected Searchable Data in IaaS
Rafael Dowsley  Antonis Michalas Matthias Nagel
SICS Technical Report T2016:01
January 2016
Abstract 
In the first part of this report we present a survey of the state of the art in searchable encryption and its relevance for 
cloud computing. In particular we focus on the OpenStack open-source cloud platform and investigate which searchable 
encryption schemes are more amenable for adoption in conjunction with platforms based on OpenStack. Based on that 
survey we chose one of the schemes to implement and test if it is practical enough to deploy in real systems. On the 
second part of this report we discuss the results of the implementation. 
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1 Introduction
Cloud Storage. In the recent years we have witnessed an astonishing increase in the o↵er of cloud
computing solutions. Taking advantage of savings due to large scale optimizations and reduction of wasted
resources (inactive computer time, unused hardware space, etc), this business model is economically
advantageous. Together with the fact that the amount of data is increasing continuously, this provides
an economical incentive for many companies and personal users to opt for outsourcing the storage of
their files to cloud service providers (CSP). But this trend raises a security issue since many clients want
to keep their files confidential. The solution is to encrypt the files before sending them to the CSP, but
there are two seemingly contradictory goals that an encryption scheme should achieve in order to be
useful in this scenario. On one hand, the encryption should satisfy a strong notion of security in order to
keep the data hidden from the CSP. On the other hand, the scheme should allow the clients to continue
performing their operations e ciently, i.e., with time and computational costs comparable to the ones
that would be incurred if the files were stored locally. One quintessential application for many clients
is searching. Therefore it is essential to develop and employ encryption schemes that allow for e cient
searching of the data stored in the cloud; if the clients have to download the entire data set and perform
the search locally, then the scheme is completely impractical.
Searchable Encryption. Searchable Encryption (SE) is an enhanced encryption technique that allows
encryption while enabling search for keywords in the encrypted data (as it would be possible in the
plaintexts). Its quintessential application is cloud storage. In searchable encryption it should be possible
for the CSP, with the help of some search token sent by the client, to locally perform some operations
and then send the relevant data to the client. The relevant data should be such that on one hand it
contains the matching documents (i.e., the documents that contain the searched keyword), but on the
other hand its size is not far bigger than that of the matching documents (i.e., the server cannot simply
transfer a large part of the database to the client on every query). Of course the CSP should not learn
the keyword that is being searched, otherwise he is learning partial information about the documents.
In the field of searchable encryption there are trade-o↵s between e ciency, functionality and security.
From the e ciency point of view it is desirable to reduce as much as possible the number of operations
performed by the server during a search. It is also highly important to make these operations parallelizable
and increase their locality (in order to improve I/O performance) so that the search time can be improved.
From the functionality point of view, one important parameter is the query expressiveness. A SE scheme
should support as powerful queries as possible, thus increasing the usefulness of the scheme to the clients.
Other important parameters are whether a single or multiple clients are supposed to write data to the
cloud and whether a single or multiple clients should be able to read the data. Additionally, schemes
for practical applications should be dynamic, i.e., they should allow updates in the database without
additional leakage. From the point of view of security, it is essential to reduce the leakage caused by all
operations as much as possible.
Depending on the requirements of the desired scheme, it possible to use either public-key cryptography
technologies or symmetric-key cryptography, but in general searchable public-key encryption schemes with
good security guarantees do not scale well because they have search time which is linear in the number
of documents.
Symmetric searchable encryption was introduced by Song et al. [26], who present a scheme that
allowed linear search time (in the number of documents) by the server. Unfortunately their scheme does
not achieve a strong notion of security: it has no security guarantees related to the leakage that can be
caused by the use of the search tokens that are given to the server in order to allow the search to be
performed on the server side. Goh [16] introduced the approach of using secure indexes in order to achieve
linear search time with stronger security guarantees. Unfortunately the search time of this approach is
inherently linear in the number of files. Curtmola et al. [15] presented the first secure scheme with sub-
linear search time using an inverted index approach (uses the keywords as index) and also introduced a
strong security model for searchable encryption which became the standard security notion for searchable
encryption in the last couple of years. The inverted index approach is quiet e cient and is in fact optimal
for the number of operations that the server has to perform during a search. Due to this reason it was
used in many subsequent works (e.g., [14, 21, 22]). One limitation of this method is that it is inherently
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sequential and thus it is hard to take advantage of parallelism to improve performance. Another problem
is that it is not well-suited for dynamic databases, which is the case of most applications. Recent works
made progress in the direction of dynamic [21, 20, 11, 23, 18] and parallel [20, 12, 11] schemes.
Symmetric searchable encryption perfectly fits the scenario where there is only a single user writes
to/reads from the database, but there is a generic construction that combines a single writer/reader
scheme with broadcast encryption in order to obtain a scheme that supports multiple readers [15]. One
additional issue in this case is revocation: a revoked user should not be able to perform searches after his
revocation.
In terms of query expressiveness, most symmetric searchable encryption schemes focus on single
equality queries, but as showed by some recents works [12, 19], it is possible to extend data structures
for single keyword symmetric searchable encryption in order to deal with more complex queries, such as
conjunctive queries for keyword combinations and general Boolean queries.
Public-key searchable encryption was introduced by Boneh et al. [8]. It allows multiple clients to
encrypt data into the database, which can be decrypted by the data owner that has the secret-key. There
are solutions allowing conjunctive, subset and range queries [9]. The e ciency of these schemes is limited
by the cost of public-key operations. Another problem of the proposed schemes with strong security
assurances is their linear search time, which prevents scalability.
OpenStack. OpenStack is a free and open-source cloud computing software platform that was in-
troduced in 2010 and is managed by the OpenStack Foundation, a non-profit corporation entity. This
project is supported by more than 200 companies around the world, including big players such as: AT&T,
AMD, Cisco, Dell, EMC, Ericsson, Fujitsu, HP, Huawei, IBM, NEC, Oracle and VMware. Our goal is
to integrate searchable encryption within cloud storage solutions based on the OpenStack platform. One
important criterium for the success of such attempt is the ability of introducing search capacities for the
encrypted data without having much modification on the server side, in order to avoid big resistance
against its adoption from the OpenStack community.
Outline. We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we discuss in more detail why searchable encryption
fits perfectly the cloud. In Section 3 we present in more detail the concept of searchable encryption and
its security model. In Section 4 we survey the current known methods for building symmetric searchable
encryption schemes. Then in Section 5 we highlight some considerations regarding the privacy of such
schemes, and in Section 6 about their e ciency. Section 7 presents the architecture of OpenStack. Then
in Section 8 we give our recommendation of the scheme that seems more appropriate for the integration
with OpenStack-based solutions. Section 9 reports on the performance of the implemented scheme.
Finally in Section 10 we present the conclusions.
2 Why Searchable Encryption Squarely Fits the Cloud
While cloud computing has exploded in popularity in recent years thanks to the potential e ciency and
cost savings of outsourcing the management of data and applications, a number of vulnerabilities that
led to various attacks have left many potential users worried. As a result, experts in the field argued
that new technologies are needed in order to create trusted cloud services - services that will eventually
eradicate the suspicion of users for cloud computing by providing the necessary security guarantees. More
precisely, despite significant improvements regarding availability and scalability of cloud services it has
been observed that the greatest concern of users that hinders the adoption of cloud computing is the
fear of storing sensitive data online. Without proper security mechanisms to protect users’ data from
unauthorized access, sensitive information is at risk of being leaked to interested third parties.
The most common solution to this problem is to make sure that users’ data is always encrypted
when it is placed on the provider’s storage hosts and while it’s in use by the cloud service. However,
such an approach does not always provide full security since all of the trust is placed on the party that is
encrypting the data and storing the encryption key. More precisely, once the cloud provider is responsible
for encrypting the data it becomes aware of the encryption/decryption key, casting doubts on the security
of users’ data in case of a malicious provider or a malicious administrator.
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One of the most promising concepts first introduced by Song et al. [26] is the so called searchable
encryption where users can search directly on encrypted data without having to decrypt them first.
In general, searchable encryption schemes aims to provide confidentiality and integrity, while retaining
main benefits of cloud storage - availability, reliability, data sharing, and ensuring requirements through
cryptographic guarantees rather than administrative controls. However, until to this day there is a lack
of practical applications that rely on searchable encryption schemes. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no public cloud provider that supports such functionality and the main reason for that is the fact that
in order to provide a reliable and e cient implementation requires additional research.
Furthermore, the latest advancements in the field of searchable encryption have the potential to
allow cloud providers to build di↵erent kinds of security levels, which will eventually lead to various
business models. Therefore, building a concrete searchable encryption scheme for the cloud will give the
opportunity to cloud providers to o↵er a range of security options for the users. More precisely, in an ideal
scenario users will be able to configure the level of security based on what kind of searchable encryption
they want to use. For example, options such as the blind storage that was proposed in [23] where users
can encrypt their data locally before sending them to the cloud and then can search directly over the
encrypted data stored in the cloud provider, will provide a set of strong security guarantees to the users
since they will be sure that even in the case of a malicious cloud provider or a corrupted administrator
the stored data will be secured since the users will be the only ones who have access to the encryption
key. In other words, even if the cloud provider tries to expose the privacy of users by looking at the
stored data it will not be able to find any valuable information as long as the underlying cryptosystem is
secure. As a second example, we can consider a protocol that will be based on proxy re-encryption that
was first introduced in [6] and allows a semi-trusted party to search through the data stored in the cloud
by using a searchable encryption key. In contrast to the previous example, such a scenario will weaken
the adversarial model since the users will have to trust a third party - the proxy server - but at the same
time will o↵er better e ciency since all the computations will not take place on user’s machine but on
the proxy. Furthermore, by using searchable encryption cloud providers will be able to o↵er a plethora of
options to the users and will eventually be able to address even the more demanding needs in the sense
of data protection.
In addition to that, cloud services that are solely based on searchable encryption schemes are the
perfect candidates for providing a realistic and reliable solution for the increasingly urgent problem of
physical location of data in cloud storage. In a short time, the aforementioned problem has evolved from
the concern of a few regulated businesses to an important consideration for many cloud storage users.
One of the characteristics of cloud storage is fluid transfer of data both within and among the data centres
of a cloud provider. However, this has weakened the guarantees with respect to control over data replicas,
protection of data in transit and physical location of data. Moreover, after the revelations of E. Snowden
some months ago and the NSA scandal the significance for finding a reliable solution that will tackle
this problem is of paramount importance. Even though, searchable encryption will not provide a direct
solution for a trusted geolocation-based mechanism for data placement control, it has the potential to
protect users’ private data from unauthorized access by providing the indispensable proofs ensuring that
unencrypted data will only be available in a jurisdiction allowed by a certain policy and defined by the
actual user.
3 General Model of Searchable Encryption
Searchable encryption allows a client to encrypt its data in such a way that he can generate search tokens
that allows the storage server to search over the encrypted data. The data can be viewed as a collection
f = (f1, . . . , fn) of n files where file fi is a sequence of words (w1, . . . , wm) from some keyword space
W. Additionally, each file fi has an unique identifier id(fi). The data is dynamic, thus file additions or
removals are allowed. In addition to the search tokens, the client also generates and sends to the server
add/delete tokens when he wants to add/delete files from the encrypted database. We formalize the
notion of dynamic symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) scheme using the extensions to the dynamic
setting by Kamara et al. [21] of the definition of Curtmola et al. [15].
Definition 3.1 (Dynamic Index-based SSE) A dynamic index-based symmetric searchable encryp-
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tion scheme is a tuple of nine polynomial algorithms SSE = (Gen,Enc, SearchToken,AddToken,DeleteToken,
Search,Add,Delete,Dec) such that:
• Gen is probabilistic key-generation algorithm that takes as input a security parameter   and outputs
a secret key K. It is used by the client to generate his secret-key.
• Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a secret key K and a collection of files f and out-
puts an encrypted index   and a sequence of ciphertexts c. It is used by the client to get ciphertexts
corresponding to his files as well as an encrypted index which are then sent to the storage server.
• SearchToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that takes as input a secret key K and a keyword
w and outputs a search token ⌧s(w). It is used by the client in order to create a search token for
some specific keyword. The token is then sent to the storage server.
• AddToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that takes as input a secret key K and a file f and
outputs an add token ⌧a(f) and a ciphertext cf . It is used by the client in order to create an add
token for a new file as well as the encryption of the file which are then sent to the storage server.
• DeleteToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that takes as input a secret key K and a file f
and outputs a delete token ⌧d(f). It is used by the client in order to create a delete token for some
file which is then sent to the storage server.
• Search is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an encrypted index  , a sequence of cipher-
texts c and a search token ⌧s(w) and outputs a sequence of file identifiers Iw ⇢ c. This algorithm
is used by the storage server upon receive of a search token in order to perform the search over the
encrypted data and determine which ciphertexts correspond to the searched keyword and thus should
be sent to the client.
• Add is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an encrypted index  , a sequence of ciphertexts
c, an add token ⌧a(f) and a ciphertext cf and outputs a new encrypted index  0 and a new sequence
of ciphertexts c0. This algorithm is used by the storage server upon receive of an add token in order
to update the encrypted index and the ciphertext vector to include the data corresponding to the new
file.
• Delete is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an encrypted index  , a sequence of ciphertexts
c and a delete token ⌧d(f) and outputs a new encrypted index  0 and a new sequence of ciphertexts
c0. This algorithm is used by the storage server upon receive of a delete token in order to update
the encrypted index and the ciphertext vector to delete the data corresponding to the deleted file.
• Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key K and a ciphertext c and outputs
a file f . It is used by the client to decrypt the ciphertexts that he gets from the storage server.
A dynamic SSE scheme is correct if for all possible security parameters and file collections, and
for secret keys, encrypted indexes and ciphertexts created using the respective algorithms and for any
sequences of add, delete and search operations handled using the respective algorithms, it holds that the
search operation always returns the correct set of indices corresponding to the searched keyword and the
returned ciphertexts can be correctly decrypted. A static SSE scheme can be defined by omitting the
algorithms AddToken,DeleteToken,Add and Delete from the definition.
In a intuitive level, a good security notion for searchable encryption would be to require that nothing
is leaked to the storage server beyond the outcome of the search (also known as access pattern), i.e., the
identifiers of the documents that contain the queried keyword. Note that the access pattern can only be
hidden using expensive techniques as oblivious RAMs [24, 17]. But the practical searchable encryption
schemes normally leak more than that: they also leak whether two queries were for the same keyword
or not, which is called the search pattern. The search pattern is leaked for instance if deterministic
search tokens are used, which is the case in the most e cient solutions. Given this fact a reasonable
definition of security for searchable encryption is requiring that nothing is leaked beyond the access and
search patterns. We should mention that some dynamic SSE schemes also leak information during the
add/delete operations.
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This intuitive idea is captured using the extension to the setting of dynamic SSE schemes (as in
[21]) of the security definition of Curtmola et al. [15], the so called security against adaptive chosen-
keyword attacks (CKA2). The leakage functions associated to index creation, search, addition and delete
operations are denoted as LI , LS , LA, LD respectively. Then the security is defined using the simulation
paradigm, which is the standard way of defining strong security guarantees in cryptography.
Definition 3.2 (Dynamic CKA2-Security) Let SSE = (Gen,Enc, SearchToken,AddToken,DeleteToken,
Search,Add,Delete,Dec) be a dynamic index-based symmetric searchable encryption scheme and LI , LS,
LA, LD be leakage functions. Then the following experiments are considered:
• RealA( ): The secret key K is generated by running Gen(1 ). The adversary A chooses a file col-
lection f and then receives an encrypted index   and the ciphertexts c such that ( , c)
$ Enc(K, f).
The adversary A can make a polynomial number of adaptive queries to get search, add and delete
tokens. The tokens are generated using the respective algorithms of SSE (the ciphertext is also gen-
erated in the case of an addition) and given to the adversary. Finally A outputs a bit b indicating
whether he thinks he is the real or ideal experiment.
• IdealA,S( ): The adversary A chooses a file collection f . The simulator S only gets LI(f) and has
to simulate an encrypted index   and ciphertexts c to send to the adversary. The adversary A is
again allowed to make adaptive queries to get search, add and delete tokens; but the simulator has
to generate the tokens (and also the ciphertext in the case of additions) to sent to the adversary
given only the leakage from either LS, LA or LD. Finally A outputs a bit b indicating whether he
thinks he is the real or ideal experiment.
SSE is (LI , LS, LA, LD)-secure against adaptive dynamic chosen-keyword attacks if for all prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversaries A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such
that
|Pr [RealA( ) = 1 ]  Pr [ IdealA,S( ) = 1 ]|  negl( ).
The intuition behind this definition is that if every adversary cannot distinguish whether the encrypted
index, ciphertexts and tokens given to him were generated using the real data and the scheme SSE or by
a simulator which only gets as input the information specified by the leakage functions, then SSE only
leaks the information specified by the leakage functions.
Using this security definition the leakage of the scheme SSE can be formally defined. As dynamic
index-based symmetric searchable encryption schemes should leak as few information as possible a good
example would be: LI leaking only the number of files and unique keywords, the identifiers of the files
and the size of the files, LS leaking only the search and access patterns, LA leaking only the size and
identifier of the added file as well as the updated number of unique keywords and LD leaking only the
updated number of unique keywords.
4 Known Approaches
4.1 Two-Layered Encryption Scheme
The first construction of SSE was presented by Song et al. [26], who developed a solution based on a special
two-layered encryption scheme. The idea is to encrypt each keyword separately using a deterministic
encryption scheme in the first layer and then use a stream cipher with a special structure for the second
layer of the encryption. The keystream for the second level is generate in a special way which allows the
detection of the keywords during an execution of the search algorithm. More specifically, for a keyword
w, in the first layer a deterministic encryption x = E(w) of w is computed and then parsed in two
parts x = x`kxr. The first part x` is then used to generate a key k for a hash function h. Finally the
keystream is chosen by picking a random seed s, which is xored with x`, and then computing h(k, s),
that is xored with xr. In order to perform a search for the keyword w the search token ⌧s(w) is x = E(w)
and the key k generated from x`. With this token the server can perform the search by testing for each
ciphertext c whether c   x has the format skh(k, s) for some s or not. Unfortunately this schemes has
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some problems. First, the scheme uses fix-sized keywords and is not compatible with existing encryption
standards. Second, it does not achieve a strong notion of security: it has no security guarantees related to
search capabilities of the scheme, the only security guarantees is about the ciphertext themselves (which
are IND-CPA secure). Indeed the scheme leaks the position of the keyword within the document, which
can lead to attacks based on statistical analysis. Finally, the search time is linear in the total number of
words contained in the documents.
4.2 (Forward) Index Approach
The first approach for designing SSE schemes with stronger security guarantees and linear search time in
the number of documents was the (forward) index approach introduced by Goh [16]. In such approach, for
each document, there is an associated encrypted data structure that is used for searching the keywords.
The index is independent of the underlying encryption algorithm. An user that possess the secret key can
generate a search token for a specific keyword, which allows the server to search for the files containing
that keyword using the index. Goh’s scheme [16] uses Bloom filters [7] to build the index. Bloom filters
are a data structure that can be used to answer set membership queries. It uses an array of ` bits which
are initially 0. For each element w to be added into the set, t independent hashes of w are computed,
where each hash function hi hashes into the set {1, . . . , `}, and then the bits hi(w) are set to 1. Using this
data structure, it is possible to check whether the keyword is present in a document or not by checking
whether all the bits outputted by hi(w) are set to 1 or not. But this method inherently produces false
positives. To avoid leaking information about the keywords, Goh’s scheme first process the keyword using
two pseudorandom functions before inserting them in the Bloom filters (the second function also takes
as input an unique document identifier in order to avoid leaking similarities between the documents).
One problem with this approach is that the number of 1s in the Bloom filter leaks information about the
number of keywords associated with that document.
Chang and Mitzenmacher [13] developed a solution without false positives. The idea is to use a
prebuilt dictionary of keywords to build an index per document. It is represented as an array with `
bits, where ` is the number of distinct keywords and each bit represents a keyword. A pseudorandom
permutation is used to hide which keyword corresponds to each bit.
The main drawback of the forward index approach is that its search time is inherently linear in the
number of files since the search is performed by using the encrypted data structure that is associated with
each specific file. Additionally, the security notions used on the works mentioned above do not guarantee
the security of the search tokens.
4.3 Inverted Index Approach
The central idea of the inverted index approach is to use an index per distinct keyword instead of per
distinct document. This change reduces the search time from linear in the number of documents to linear
in the number of documents that contain the searched keyword, which is optimal. The first schemes using
this approach were presented by Curtmola et al. [15].
The idea of the scheme is that for each keyword w there is a linked list Lw which contains the identifiers
of the documents that contain the keyword w. But these linked lists cannot be store in a straight-forward
and unencrypted way, since this would leak information. The idea is that the nodes of all linked lists are
stored together in an array A, in a scrambled order and in an encrypted format. The plaintext of each
node consists of three parts: the identifier of one document, the key used to encrypt the next node of the
linked list and the pointer to the next node of the linked list. What is then needed in order to perform
the search for keyword w is the key used to encrypt the first node of Lw and a pointer to its location
within A. This information is stored, encrypted, in a pseudorandom position of a look-up table T . The
search token ⌧s(w) then consists of the position in T used for keyword w together with the key that was
used to encrypt this entry of T . This scheme achieves security according to the strong security notion of
Curtmola et al. [15] against non-adaptive adversaries, i.e., the adversary has to choose the values it will
query at onset before seeing any other information.
In order to obtain security against adaptive adversaries, Curtmola et al. [15] also proposed a second
scheme, which has bigger communication and storage complexities. The idea is to use a look-up table T
directly, but with extended labels. For a keyword w appearing in n documents, the extended labels are
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wk1, . . . wkn and for each of them there is an associated pseudorandom entry of T containing the identifier
of one of the documents in which w appears. The keyword wMAX that appears more often on distinct
documents has to be determined and in also how many documents MAX it appears. The search token
for w consists of the outputs of permutation that scrambles T applied on the inputs wk1, . . . wkMAX.
Of course the scheme has to pad the table with dummy entries so that the identifier of each document
appears in the same number of entries. The search in this scheme is linear in the maximum number of
documents that contain a single keyword, i.e. MAX.
Chase and Kamara [14] proposed structured encryption, which is a generalization of index-based SSE
schemes. They also noticed that the simpler scheme of Curtmola et al. [15] (i.e., the one that is only
secure against non-adaptive adversaries) can be also be made secure against adaptive adversaries by
requiring the symmetric encryption scheme that is used to encrypt the nodes to be non-committing.
Kurosawa and Ohtaki [22] showed that it is possible to extend the second SSE scheme of Curtmola
et al. [15] (i.e., the one that is secure against adaptive adversaries and has linear search time) in order to
achieve a stronger notion of security (UC security [10]) that guarantees security against active adversaries
(instead of only against passive ones, as considered in the other works). The idea is to extend the scheme
by using message authentication codes in order to make it a verifiable SSE scheme. The biggest limitation
of the resulting scheme is its linear search time.
One big limitation of these schemes is that they are not explicitly dynamic. The arrays would need to
be updated when a file addition/deletion is performed, and using general techniques for making it dynamic
would result in an ine cient final scheme. The other big problem is that they are not parallelizable since
the encrypted indexes used in these schemes store data at random positions and the location of the next
position to be accessed is only learned when the data in the current one is retrieved.
4.3.1 Achieving Dynamicity Using a Deletion Array
One idea to obtain a dynamic SSE is to use a deletion array [21]. Using the simpler scheme of Curtmola
et al. [15] (which is secure against non-adaptive) as a starting point, Kamara et al. [21] were able to
perform modifications in order to obtain the first secure dynamic SSE scheme1, which is proven secure
in the random oracle model. The two limitations of the original scheme are that it is only secure against
non-adaptive adversaries and that it is not explicitly dynamic. The first limitation can be overcome by
using a non-committing symmetric encryption scheme as mentioned above, but the second one is more
di cult to overcome.
The problem is that when a file is added/deleted, the nodes in the search array A have to be updated.
More specifically, when a file f is deleted, the nodes in A corresponding to f should be cleared. And
when a file f is added, it is necessary to locate free locations in A to add the nodes corresponding to f .
Additionally, when a file is added or deleted, some pointers in the linked list have to be updated (but
they are encrypted). To deal with this, Kamara et al. [21] use the following techniques: (1) a deletion
array keeps track of the search array positions that need to be modified if a file deletion occurs. This
deletion array can be queried given a token that is generated by the client. (2) There is a list of free
nodes which keeps tracks of the free positions in the search array A and can be used by the server when
a file is added. (3) The pointers are encrypted using a homomorphic encryption scheme in order to allow
modifications without decrypting. Specifically, the encryption is done by XORing the message with the
output of a PRF (note that this construction is also non-committing).
In the proof of security against adaptive adversaries of static SSE schemes, the queried keywords
can be chosen based on the encrypted index and the results of the previous queries, and this requires
the simulator to create an encrypted index which is equivocable, i.e., the simulator creates a “fake”
encrypted index, and later on, when a keyword is queried for the first time, the simulator can generate an
appropriate search token ⌧s(w). This level of equivocation was achieved by simply using non-committing
encryption schemes [15, 14]. But in the case of dynamic SSE schemes, a higher level of equivocation is
required. The problem is that the adversary can initially query a keyword w in order to commit the
simulator to a search token ⌧s(w), then add a file f that contains w (the simulator does not know about
this fact, and thus cannot modify the encrypted index in a meaningful way) and finally query w again,
1van Liesdonk et al. [28] designed an explicitly dynamic SSE scheme, but they only presented a formal security proof
for the case of static file collections. Additionally, the encrypted index in their scheme is relatively large.
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at which point the simulator is already committed to the search token ⌧s(w) but was not able to modify
the encrypted index appropriately to reflect the changes. To deal with this problem, Kamara et al. [21]
designed the scheme so that the adversary needs to query a random oracle during the execution of the
search algorithm, and then random oracle provides the required level of equivocation for the simulator.
The main problem with this scheme is that the leakage function associated with the addition/deletion
of files leaks too much information: it leaks the search tokens corresponding to the keywords contained
in the added/deleted file. In the important case in which the database is initially empty and the files are
incrementally added by the client, this scheme is no more secure than using a deterministic encryption
scheme.
4.3.2 Achieving Dynamicity by Learning the Inverted Index On-the-Fly
Another idea to obtain dynamic SSE schemes is to build the inverted index on-the-fly, as proposed by
due to Hahn and Kerschbaum [18]. It is based on the idea of learning the inverted index for e cient
access from the access pattern itself. In such approach, one starts with a forward index based searchable
encryption scheme (using the files as index) that requires linear scans and an empty inverted index.
When a keyword is searched for the first time, its deterministic search token (for the inverted index) is
learned and also the access pattern. Then that keyword is incorporated into the inverted index. When
new searches are done for the same keyword, the inverted index is used to search in sub-linear time.
Additionally, if an added/deleted file contains a keyword which is already in the inverted index, then the
entry corresponding to that keyword in the inverted index is updated.
The central observation used in this approach is that the search tokens of the known SSE constructions
stay valid for future usage (until the entire system is rekeyed). Hence, if a keyword was already searched
and its search token learned by the server, then updating the inverted index entry corresponding to that
keyword can be done without leaking additional information to the server (the server could already use
the old search token to test if the added/deleted files contained that keyword anyway).
Using this approach it is possible to obtain a scheme which has asymptotically optimal amortized
search time (if the number of search queries is large enough) and small index size, and for which it is
proved in the random oracle model that the updates leak no more information than the access pattern
(i.e., no more than what can be inferred from the search tokens). The obtained scheme can either have
no storage on the client side other than the keys, or store the search history in the client in order to
improve the performance of the update procedure. The main drawback of this approach is that the time
for the first search of a keyword is linear.
4.4 Keyword Red-Black Tree
Given the inherently sequential nature of the inverted index approach and the fact that the dynamic SSE
schemes based on that approach are very complex and di cult to implement, Kamara and Papamanthou
[20] developed an alternative method for obtaining SSE schemes which also enjoys sub-linear search time,
but is highly parallelizable and easily handles dynamic file collections. It uses a structure similar to red-
black trees and so was named as keyword red-black tree. The keyword red-black tree is then encrypted
using pseudorandom functions and permutations, and a random oracle. The final scheme has the same
asymptotic e ciency as an unencrypted keyword red-black tree.
The keyword red-black tree is binary tree-based multi-map data structure. It is assumed that the
universe of keywords is fixed (m in total) and much smaller than the number of files, which can grow
dynamically. Additionally a total order on the documents f = (f1, . . . , fn) is imposed by the ordering
of the identifiers. At the leaves of tree, pointers to the appropriate documents are stored. At each
internal node u of the tree, a m-bit vector du = du,1 . . . du,m is stored, in which du,i corresponds to the
i-th keyword wi of the universe. The bit du,i is set to 1 if, and only if, one of the files associated with
u’s children contains the keyword wi. This can be e ciently computed by starting at the leaves, and
then for the internal nodes computing du as the bitwise OR of the values of its two children. To search
for a keyword wi, simply start at the root and continue recursively until either a node is achieved in
which du,i = 0 (no file associated with the children nodes contain wi) or a leaf is achieved for which
the associated file contains wi. One reason why this data structure is useful is that it supports both
keyword-based operations (following the paths from the root to the leaves), which are used for searching,
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and file-based operations (following paths from the leaves to the root), which are used to handle updates.
Another useful property is that the search in each children can continue using a di↵erent processor. The
idea for encrypting the data structure is the following: for each keyword wi there is a distinct key that
is used to encrypt the bits du,i (for all u). The encrypted bit du,i is then stored at one of two hash
tables associated with node u, at a pseudorandom position. Whether it is stored in the first or second
hash table depends on the output of a random oracle. The other table will contain a random value in
the respective position. In order to perform an update, the server performs a structure update on the
keyword red-black tree which involves the necessary rotations that are performed during an update of
a red-black tree (in order to maintain a a logarithmic height). Note that for performing this operation
only the file identifier is required. The server then sends to the client the part of the tree that needs to
be updated, and the clients answers with a token that allows the server to update the values at those
positions.
Using these building blocks, the scheme was proved to be secure in the random oracle model. The
updates do not leak any information apart from what can be inferred from the previous search tokens
(in contrast with the scheme by Kamara et al. [21] for instance) and can be e ciently performed since
all information about a file f can be found and updated in O(log |f |) time, but require one and a half
rounds of interaction. The total search time is almost optimal (loose by a factor O(log |f |)), but it is
easily parallelizable, and if !(log |f |) processors are used, its clock search time is smaller than the optimal
sequential search time. If a large enough number of processors is available, the resulting clock search
time is of O(log |f |). One drawback of this scheme is that the data structure has size O(m · |f |) and the
constants are quite high.
4.5 Dictionary Entry per Combination of File and Keyword
As large databases are the main motivation for outsourcing storage Cash et al. [11] proposed a (dynamic)
SSE scheme based on a new approach that was designed with scalability to very-large databases (in the
order of billions of file/keyword pairs) in mind. The new approach for designing (dynamic) SSE schemes
is based on the idea of storing each occurring combination (file f , keyword w) as an entry in a generic
dictionary data structure. Their scheme associates a pseudorandom label with each file/keyword pair, and
then stores the encrypted file identifier with that label in a generic dictionary data structure. The labels
are computed in such a way that the client, given a keyword w that he wants to search, can compute
a short, keyword-specific key Kw that allows the server to perform the search by first recovering the
necessary labels, then retrieving the encrypted file identifiers from the dictionary and decrypting them.
In more detail, this is done by using a pseudorandom function with the key Kw to create the labels and
then applying it to a counter in order to generate the labels for each (file f , keyword w) pair. The search
in this scheme is fully parallelizable, which is a key parameter for allowing the scalability of SSE schemes.
To allow additions to the database, the clients need to be able to compute the labels for the added data.
This in turn requires either the storage of counters by the client or communication that is proportional
to the total number of keywords ever added or deleted. Deletions are handled via a pseudorandom
revocation list kept by the server and used by the server to filter out the results. Space can only be
reclaimed via periodical re-encryption of the complete database.
In order to achieve the goal of scaling well for databases consisting of billions of file/keyword pairs, on
top of providing a basic scheme using a dictionary, modifications to improve the I/O performance were
also performed (SSE schemes often store data at random locations, thus resulting in a lack of locality,
which is important for the I/O performance). In typical databases there is a huge variability in the
number of matches for di↵erent keywords, so for improving the performance the scheme needs to be
modified to take this fact into account. One technique used to reduce the number of dictionary retrievals
is packing the related results together. A di↵erentiation is done between keywords with small set of
associated files, with medium set and with big set. For small sets, the file identifiers are stored directly
(in a packed form) in the dictionary. For medium sets, blocks of pointers are stored in the dictionary
and they point to blocks of file identifiers that are stored in random positions of an array. For large sets,
there are two levels of indirection: the dictionary stores block of pointers that point to block of pointers
(stored in the array) that point to blocks of file identifiers.
This scheme is secure against non-adaptive adversaries in the standard model and against adaptive
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adversaries in the random oracle model, has minimal leakage, optimal server index size (i.e., its size is of
the order of the number of file/keyword pairs), optimal searching time (i.e., of the order of the number of
files matching the keyword) and allows fully parallel searching. The fact that either storage in the client
side is required (to keep track of counters used in the updates) or expensive communication is needed is
one disadvantage of this scheme. The main disadvantage is that additional storage (linear in the number
of deletes) is required on the server side in order to store the revocation list and the space corresponding
to the delete items can only be reclaimed if the complete database is re-encrypted. Hence this scheme is
really good only for applications where deletions are relatively rare.
4.6 Hierarchical Structure of Logarithmic Levels
Stefanov et al. [27] proposed a dynamic SSE scheme that uses a hierarchical structure of logarithmic
levels (which is reminiscent from techniques for oblivious RAMs). For P pairs of file/keywords, the server
stores a hierarchical data structure containing logP + 1 levels. Each level ` can store up to 2` entries,
where each entry encrypts the information about one keyword k, one identifier of a file f that contains
w, the type of operation performed (either add or delete) and a counter for the number of occurrences of
keyword w in the level `. The scheme ensures that within the same level only one operation is stored for
each pair of file/keyword. For performing the search operation one search token per level of the structure
is used. In this scheme, every update induces a rebuild of levels in the data structure. The basic idea is
to take the new entry together with the entries in consecutive full levels 1, . . . , `  1 and merge them at
level `.
This scheme has small leakage, data structure of linear size (in the number of file/keyword pairs), and
both updates and searches are in sub-linear time. In contrast to the other schemes it achieves the notion
of forward security: the search tokens used in the past cannot be used to search for the keyword in the
documents that are added afterwards. It is achieved due to the fact that every time a level is rebuilt a
new key is used to encrypt the entries within that level. But this smaller leakage comes at the expense
of poly-logarithmic overhead (in the number of file/keyword pairs) on top of Dynamic SSE overhead of
other schemes.
4.7 Blind Storage
Naveed et al. [23] introduced a basic primitive called blind storage, which allows the client to store a
collection of files on the server in such a way that all the information about them is kept secret from the
server until they are accessed, including how many files are stored and the lengths of each file. When a
file is accessed, the server learns about its existence and size; but not its name or contents. The server
can also notice if the same file is accessed multiple times.
They build a blind storage scheme by storing each file as a collection of blocks that are kept in
pseudorandom locations. There is an upper bound N on the number of data blocks that can be stored.
Given a file f with n blocks, ↵n locations of the set {1, . . . , N} are chosen using a pseudorandom number
generation and the n blocks of f are stored in n of these positions. The reason to choose ↵ as many blocks
as necessary to store f is that maybe there are collisions with the storage positions of other files. Hence
the ↵n positions that are retrieved from the server to access f are chosen completely independently from
the other files (and so this does not leak any information to the server) and then f is stored encrypted
in n of these positions. One issue is that the client needs to know the amount of blocks in f to retrieve
it. This can be achieve by either storing these information on the client (which is practical if the data
collection consists of a small number of relatively large files) or by storing this information in the first
block and adding one additional round of interaction in which the client retrieves the  first blocks of
f . This construction also supports dynamic blind storage; the updates leak the size of the files. For a
typical scenario one can have a blowup factor ↵ = 4.
The idea to obtain a SSE scheme from this blind storage scheme is to store, for all keywords, the
search index entries (which lists all the files containing the keyword) as individual files in the blind
storage scheme. In the case of the dynamic SSE scheme, the original files and the added files are treated
di↵erently by their scheme that uses two di↵erent indexes. The index corresponding to the original files
is done using the blind storage scheme and lazy deletion (i.e., after the deletion of one of the original files,
10
the index file of a keyword is not updated before the first search is done for that keyword). The index
corresponding to the added files is done using a much simpler scheme which support e cient updates.
On the positive side, in this scheme the server does not need to perform any computation, but only
to provide interfaces for uploading and downloading files, which makes the scheme much transparent
for using in cloud environments. Additionally its proof of security is in the standard model, which is a
consequence of the fact that the server does not carry out any decryption. On the negative side, the
biggest problem with this scheme is that it does not provide the same level of security for original and
added files. The updates leak a deterministic function of the keywords and so the security guarantees for
the added files are much weaker than for the original files. This is particularly worrisome for databases
which starts (almost) empty and grows over the time, which is often the case in practice.
4.8 Extensions to More Complex Queries and Models
All the methodologies described before focused on the case of single-keyword searches. Cash et al. [12]
showed how to extend the data structures of SSE schemes that allow single-keyword searches in order
to permit more expressive queries such as conjunctive search and general Boolean queries (via the OXT
protocol of [12]). The information stored in these data structures is expanded from simple document
identifiers to also include protocol-specific values (of the OXT protocol). The central idea of the OXT
protocol is to start the search with the least frequent keyword using the basic search scheme of the
single-keyword SSE scheme and then use the specific values of the OXT protocol in order to filter out
the documents that do not match the remaining keywords. In order to do that the protocol uses a
pre-computed two-party protocol based on the decisional Di e-Hellman assumption about discrete-log
related hard computational problems. Using this methodology it is possible to allow more expressive
queries while maintaining the search performance. The price to pay is the bigger leakage profile.
Jarecki et al. [19] similarly showed how to extend those data structures in order to allow more
complex multi-client SSE settings. In these settings, the client doing the searches is not necessarily the
data owner, but only gets search tokens from the data owner in order to perform the authorized queries
that he wants. They present solutions for both the case in which the data owner can and cannot learn
the searched terms. Their solution is essentially an extension of the OXT protocol.
5 Privacy Issues
There are obviously trade-o↵s that have to de done in the area of searchable encryption in order to achieve
functionality. This is captured in the security proof of the schemes by the leakage function. A very nice
leakage profile for a SSE scheme would be to leak only the outcome of the search (i.e., the identifiers
of the documents that contain the queried keyword), which is known as the access pattern, as trying to
hide this information requires the use of expensive techniques. But normally one has to make a bigger
compromise: the current e cient approaches use deterministic search tokens, which leads to the leakage
of the search pattern (i.e., whether two queries are for the same keyword or not). In addition to access
and search patterns, many schemes also leak some general information, such as number of files, number
of keyword, number of file/keyword pairs, etc; but this kind of information is a reasonably acceptable
form of leakage.
The main problem with leakage occurs in dynamic SSE schemes since many schemes leak additional
information during the add/delete operations. One dangerous form of such leakage is leaking the search
tokens corresponding to the keywords contained in the added/deleted file (even for the keywords that
were not searched in past) [21]. This renders the scheme inappropriate for databases in which most of the
data is added incrementally (the scheme would be no more secure than using a deterministic encryption
scheme if the database is initially empty and the files are incrementally added by the client). Of course,
if the deterministic search tokens are still valid in the future (which is the case in all current schemes
except [27]), then the server can obviously test them against the added files in order to learn if the added
file contains the keywords that were searched in the past and there is nothing one can do about this.
Extending a SSE scheme that allow single-keyword searches in order to allow more complex queries
[12] also implies an extended leakage function. In this case, it is not completely clear how dangerous this
additional leakage can be for the users. In the specific case of the OXT protocol [12] care should be take
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to always use the least frequent keyword as the first keyword in the query, so that the additional leakage
due to the OTX protocol is as limited as possible.
6 E ciency
In terms of e ciency one essential parameter is the search time complexity: schemes which have search
time which is linear in the number of documents are impractical in most scenarios. Therefore it is essential
to have sub-linear search time, and ideally optimal search time (i.e., search time which is proportional
to the number of documents that contain the queried keyword). Schemes that have a search time which
is asymptotically optimal, but have linear search time for the first search of a keyword (such as [18]) are
not useful in all practical scenarios. Having a poly-logarithmic (in the number of files) overhead over the
optimal search time [20, 27] can also be problematic in the case of databases with large number of small
files.
Another important parameter is the possibility of making the search in parallel. Schemes supporting
this feature (e.g., [20, 11]) are particularly amenable for usage in a cloud environment. Additionally,
the scheme should ideally be designed so that it maximizes the I/O performance [11] by improving the
locality of the data structures used for searching.
Another main parameter is the size of the data structures that need to be stored by the server (and
possibly by the client). Ideally the data structure kept by the server should have optimal size (i.e., size
of the order of the number of file/keyword pairs). The need for additional storage (linear in the number
of deletes) in order to store a revocation list (e.g., [11]) can be troublesome in the case of highly dynamic
file collections. Of course not recovering the space corresponding to the delete items until the database is
completely re-encrypted [11] can limit the applicability to scenarios where deletions are quite infrequent.
Storing some small amount of information on the client side (such as one counter per keyword [11] or the
search history [18]) in order to improve the performance can be a good solution in some scenarios, but a
problem in others.
Finally the number of rounds of interaction between the client and the server should be kept as small
as possible in order to minimize network delay.
7 Openstack
The OpenStack project is a leading open-source cloud management platform, receiving support and
contributions from multiple large vendors and a large community of individual contributors. Currently,
OpenStack has only rudimentary native support for protection of data at rest, which allows limited
actions for volume encryption, ephemeral disk encryption and object storage encryption.
Implementation of a searchable encryption scheme for the OpenStack Database components would
significantly boost the security of OpenStack cloud deployments. A first use case for implementing
searchable encryption in OpenStack is encrypted access to OpenStack service configuration data.
7.1 Architectural Overview
OpenStack is a free and open source cloud management platform, which allows to set up, operate and
maintain large-scale cloud computing deployments. It is one of the largest open source cloud management
platforms, supported by more than 500 companies2. Since its first release in 2010, OpenStack has had a
rapid community-driven evolution and is currently at its eighth release.
On a higher level, OpenStack is a collection of independent components that communicate with
each other through public APIs and collectively form a robust cloud computing platform. Some of the
core OpenStack services are the dashboard which serves as a graphical user interface for the compute
component, the image store and a object store. The three latter components authenticate through an
authentication component.
The current release of OpenStack (“Kilo”) comprises five components which correspond to the above
logical structure:
2List of supporting organization: http://www.openstack.org/foundation/companies/
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• OpenStack Compute (code-name Nova) is a core component of OpenStack and focuses on providing
on-demand virtual servers. Nova o↵ers several services, spawned on di↵erent nodes in an OpenStack
deployment depending on the purpose of the node. The services are nova-api, nova-compute, nova-
volume, nova-network and nova-schedule. Additional services, which are not part of nova but are
however used by it are a queue serve (currently RabbitMQ is used, however any other queue system
can be used instead) as well as a SQL database connection service (MySQL and PostgreSQL are
supported for production, sqlite3 for testing purposes).
• OpenStack Networking (code-name Neutron) is a core project implementing support for a range of
networking models that fulfil the needs of various applications and user groups. While basic models
include flat networks with VLANs for tenant isolation, Neutron can be extended to take advantage
of the Software-Defined Networking model and create massively scalable multi-tenant virtualized
networks. The extension framework also allows to deploy and manage software implementations of
additional network services, e.g. load balancing, firewalls, virtual private networks, etc.
• OpenStack Dashboard (code-name Horizon) is a Django-based dashboard which serves as a user
and administrator interface to OpenStack. The dashboad is deployed through mod wsgi in Apache
and is separated into a reusable python component and a presentation layer. Keystone also uses
an easily replaceable data store which keeps information from other OpenStack components.
• OpenStack Image Service (code-name Glance) is VM image repository that stores and versions
the images that are made available to the users initially or modified through subsequent runtime
updates.
• OpenStack Object Storage (code-name Swift) is an object store with a distributed architecture which
aims to avoid single points of failure and facilitate horizontal scalability. It is limited to the storage
and retrieval of files and does not support mounting directories as in the case of a fileserver.
• OpenStack Identity (code-name Keystone) is a unified point of integration for the OpenStack pol-
icy, token and catalog authentication. Keystone has a pluggable architecture to support multiple
integrations, and currently LDAP, SQL and Key-Value Store backends are supported.
• OpenStack Block Storage (code-name Cinder) manages the creation and operation of block devices
on servers, enabling tenants to fulfil their storage requirements. The block storage system is appro-
priate for performance-sensitive scenarios (e.g. database storage, expandable file systems, access
to raw block-level storage, etc.). Besides the native block storage implementation, the OpenStack
Block Storage currently provides support for other storage platforms (e.g. Ceph, NetApp, etc.).
• OpenStack Telemetry (code-name Ceilometer) service aggregates usage and performance data across
OpenStack services and provides support for billing and a global resource utilization map. This is
necessary as service provides often require to collect accurate information about the utilization of
computing, storage and networking resources within a certain infrastructure cloud deployment.
• OpenStack Orchestration (code-name Heat) In order to support scalable, large-scale cluster deploy-
ment, OpenStack uses a template-based orchestration engine which allows automated deployment
of infrastructure. The orchestration engine is used both for pre- and post-deployment actions and
configuration changes, as well as for auto-scaling of key infrastructure elements based on the infor-
mation provided by the telemetry service.
• OpenStack Database (code-name Trove) service provides a native OpenStack relational database
which can be used for infrastructure management tasks, such as a deployment, patching, backing
up, restoring and monitoring infrastructure components.
• OpenStack Bare-Metal Provisioning (code-name Ironic) service aims to provision bare metal (i.e.
non-virtualized) computing resources similar to the current application of PXE and IPMI protocols.
All of the above described components interact through a set of REST application programming
interfaces (APIs) and form the fabric of a cloud computing infrastructure deployment.
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The OpenStack documentation 3 describes in details each of the above named components and their
interaction.
7.2 Storage Protection Mechanims
There are currently several mechanisms for protection of data in OpenStack, both for data at rest and
data in transit. While data in transit can be protected using common mechanism such as TLS and
IPSec, we instead focus on the storage protection mechanisms found in OpenStack. When it comes
to confidentiality of data at rest, the available functionality is limited to basic symmetric encryption
capabilities. Thus, OpenStack tenants have the following complementary options: volume (i.e. block
storage) encryption, ephemeral disk encryption and object storage encryption.
The volume encryption functionality in OpenStack supports per-tennant creation and usage of en-
crypted volumes, as well as encrypted backups and is exposed to a key management service. Some
proposed approaches for volume encryption allow to transparently mount volumes to guest virtual ma-
chines with the encryption and decryption being handled by the disk encryption subsystem of the cloud
host. However, this functionality is not currently integrated in the o cial OpenStack release.
The ephemeral disk encryption feature allows encryption of the temporary work space used by each
individual virtual host operating system. This prevents plain-text vestigial information from earlier
tenants to be left on the physical disks of the cloud hosts.
Finally, object storage encryption is currently limited to disk-level encryption per node. The encryp-
tion functionality for the Swift object storage is currently under development.
7.3 Searchable Encryption in OpenStack
Searchable encryption has the potential to considerable expand the use of encryption of data at rest within
OpenStack and directly contribute to the proliferation of security-hardened OpenStack deployments.
Furthermore, a contribution of an implementation of a searchable encryption scheme for the block storage
in OpenStack would be welcomed by the OpenStack community and give significant visibility among
the users and contributors of the project.
A feasible target for implementing searchable encryption functionality is the OpenStack Database
(code-name Trove). The database contains sensitive configuration data and is accessed for operational
purposes by various components of the OpenStack deployment. Disclosure of such sensitive configuration
information can lead to a complete and irreversible compromise of the cloud deployment. Implementing
searchable encryption functionality for the configuration database would allow the system components to
identify and retrieve encrypted entries in the configuration database without having to decrypt the entire
set of stored data. This would help protect the confidentiality of the data with a minimal communication
overhead.
8 Recommendation for Implementation
In the light of the issues discussed in the previous sections it is obvious that some kind of compromise
has to be done as none of the state of art searchable encryption schemes achieves all the ideal attributes.
Sub-linear time and support for dynamic databases are with great probability the most important points
and therefore they should be supported by the scheme chosen to be integrated with OpenStack. Another
important facet, as pointed in the introduction, is the ability to add support for search over encrypted
data while changing the server side as less as possible (in order to minimize the resistance against its
adoption from the side of the OpenStack community). Taking these parameters into account the scheme
of Naveed et al. [23] stands out as the most appropriate for integration with OpenStack-based platforms
as it views the cloud simply as a storage service, has optimal search time and supports dynamic databases.
One additional advantage of that scheme is that it has a security proof in the standard security model,
as opposed to most schemes which were only proven to be secure in the heuristic random oracle model.
The disadvantage of the scheme is that the level of security for the added files is smaller than for the
3OpenStack Documentation Page http://docs.openstack.org
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GNU Toolchain (GCC compiler) 5.2.1
Boost 1.58.0
Crypto++ 5.6.1
Curl++ 0.7.3
Curl 7.43.0
(a) Build environment, libraries and versions
↵ (expansion factor) 4
 (minimal number of blocks per file) 80
block size (bytes) 4096
total block number 218
(b) Runtime parameters
CPU AMD A10-7850K Radeon R7
RAM 16 GB
OS Ubuntu Desktop 15.10
(c) Client environment
CPU virtual CPU with 1 core (see client)
RAM 2 GB
OS Debian 8 (Jessie)
(d) Server environment (actually not used)
Table 1: Experimental setup
original files, but we considered that this is the best trade-o↵ possible given the current state of a↵airs
in the field of searchable encryption. Therefore our choice was to implement the scheme of Naveed et
al. [23] in order to check its performance for real applications and the possibility of integrating it with
OpenStack.
9 Implementation Report
During the project we implemented the Searchable Encryption Scheme on top of a Blind Storage System
as proposed by [23]. In order to be comparable with their findings our implementation was built with the
same tool chain and uses the same third party libraries as far as known. This is to say, the application
is written in ISO C++ 2011 and uses the Boost [1], Crypto++ [2] and CurlPP [5, 3] libraries.
CurlPP is a multi-protocol network library and we used it for all network IO. We used the Crypto++
library for all cryptographic primitives. The Boost library was used for two di↵erent aspects. On the one
hand, we used it to abstract from OS-dependent parts such as runtime configuration and user interaction.
This part does not contribute to the performance measurement, because any interaction “with the outside
world” (like reading runtime parameters and user input) only occurs during the start-up phase of the
program and not during the actual processing phase. Moreover, the Boost library is used to split the
files into tokens and to create lists of keywords that are stored in the index and can be searched for. We
stress this aspect, because [23] do not state how the files were preprocessed and tokenized and our results
are absolutely not comparable to theirs (see details ahead in this section). For more details on the build
environment see Table 1a.
We chose a comparable environment as [23] (see Table 1c) but had to change the runtime parameters
to those depicted in Table 1b. The reasons are explained in Section 9.1.
Originally, we planned to run our performance measurements in a somewhat realistic scenario with
a real FTP server and virtualized network communication. For this purpose a virtual machine was set
up on the same host as the client (see Table 1d). All network communication was sent through a virtual
network between the client and the FTP server running within the virtual machine. However, this idea
was discarded very soon and the network attached storage was replaced by a local storage (Section 9.1).
We also used the Enron dataset [4] and selected random subsets of appropriate size for the experiments.
9.1 Preliminary remarks
In a first experiment we initialized the blind storage system with the parameters used by Naveed, Prab-
hakaran, and Gunter, i.e. 222 blocks with 256 bytes each or in other words 1GB of total storage space.
The backend storage was provided by a FTP server inside a virtual machine. The build phase of the blind
storage took about 590 s of e↵ective CPU time (312 s in user space and 278 s in system space) but roughly
6 hours of real execution time. We repeated the same experiment with a much smaller number of blocks
and traced all function calls by means of the profiling tool CallGrind as part of the instrumentation suite
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Valgrind [25]. This revealed that 95% of the running time was spent within the FTP client library. Each
of the 222 blocks is represented by a single file that needs to be transferred between the client and the
server. No matter how the file transfer was scheduled (sequentially, n-parallel, reuse of TCP connections)
the FTP transfer represented a serious bottle neck. The initialization and termination of a individual file
transfer creates a non-negligible overhead especially if each file (or block) has only 256 bytes of payload.
This still holds if the FTP connection as a whole is kept open and is reused for all transfers.
Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter did not consider the IO time for their performance analysis, hence
we decided to replace the FTP storage by a local storage4. After that the real execution time dropped
down to 500 s (instead of 6 h). However, we stress that for any realistic deployment this is a serious
concern, because the whole point in having a blind storage system is to put it on some untrusted network
storage. To ignore the time spent on network file transfer leads to seriously misleading numbers.
Originally, we also planned to use the same runtime parameters as Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter.
This means 222 blocks with 256 bytes each. But this choice of parameters lead to a waste of disk space. In
order to store 222 blocks (or files) one has to use some kind of hierarchical naming scheme similar to what
is internally used by many proxy daemons. In our case the files representing the blocks were enumerated
from ./00/00/00.bin through ./3f/ff/ff.bin. This directory structure already occupies disk space
by itself. Moreover, a file size of 256 bytes cannot be recommended, because most filesystems allocate
files in chunks of 4 kB. On an EXT-4 filesystem the bare directory structure already used 0.5GB and the
fully built blind storage scheme with 1 GB storage net capacity used 34GB of tangible disk space.
Hence, we tweaked the parameters and used 218 blocks with 4 kB each (see Table 1b) to better match
the underlying filesystem’s own parameters. With these settings the bare directory structure only used
8.2MB and the complete blind storage scheme allocated 1.1GB of real disc space. Thus, the overhead
dropped down to 10%. Moreover, the real execution time of the built phase further declined to 125 s
whereby 12 s were spent in user-space and 113 s were spent in kernel-space.
We want to stress that we did not do the math to check if these modified settings o↵er the same level
of security and success probability. Most likely, they do not, because the number of blocks were reduced,
but a storage and processing overhead of 34 is not acceptable for any realistic scenario.
9.2 Methodology
Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter state that they concentrated on client-side computation time and
the reported numbers suggests that they somehow calculated out the costs for IO operations (especially
because they used a remote DropBox as their backend). Moreover they report that the symmetric
encryption (AES) accounts for a significant part of the runtime. We cannot support this statement if IO
operations over a network are considered, but the statement becomes true if all network operations are
replaced by local disk IO. In this case CallGrind [25] reports that 35% of the runtime is spent inside the
AES library.
However, it is not clear at all how Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter measured the “bare” computation
time. One approach is to use an instrumentation suite such as Valgrind [25] and look at the time being
spent in individual function calls. But this raises the question what functions to look at. Moreover this
approach is highly implementation specific.
Another approach is to query the process scheduler of the operating system and look at the amount
of the process spent in user-space and kernel-space. One could argue that the time spent in user-space is
the “true” computation time (tokenization, index calculation, encryption) while the time spent in kernel-
space is related to IO. However, this is misleading. Even after we replaced all network IO by local file
IO and thus reducing the total execution time of the built phase of the blind storage from 6h to 125 s
the process spent 90% of its time in kernel-space (113 s vs. 12 s). However, as already stated 35% of the
runtime was due to the AES operations. These observations are consistent, because a huge portion of
the AES operation is memory management and thus contributes to the execution time in kernel-space.
In summary, we decided to take the total execution time from process creation through process
termination as reported by the Linux time-command. Hence, we do not distinguish between di↵erent
aspects of the execution time. With respect to practical deployment we argue this is a sane approach,
4Essentially, all function calls to the FTP library were replaced by equivalent local system calls
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number of blocks (218) / total net size (GiB) 1 2 3 4 6 8
size of bare directory structure (MiB) 4.02 8.04 12.1 16.1 24.1 32.1
total gross size on disk (GiB) 1.01 2.02 3.04 4.05 6.07 8.09
overhead (%) 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.13
average total runtime (s) 62.8 125 189 250 375 501
Table 2: Parameters and results of test 1 (the block size was held constant at 4 kiB)
Total net size of files (MB) 1 2 4
Number of files 214 421 1267
Number of file-keyword-pairs 54945 111546 246657
Total execution time (s) 148 315 964
Table 3: Results of test 2: Indexing and uploading documents
because a typical end-user does not care what contributes to the runtime. However, keep in mind that
all numbers are generated with a local storage backend and not with a NAS backend.
9.3 Test 1: Building the Blind Storage System
Deviating from the numbers depicted in Table 1b the first series of tests built a blind storage system at
di↵erent sizes by varying the number of blocks. The block size was kept at 4 kB to match the underlying
filesystem. The results are depicted in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, the runtime is linear in the total size of
the Blind Storage scheme.
9.4 Test 2: Indexing and uploading documents
Due to our changed runtime parameters (218 blocks 4 kiB instead of 222 blocks 256B) we were unable
to upload up to 256MiB of files, because the scheme ran out of free first blocks prematurely. 256MiB
was the size of the maximum test set of Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter. We were able to upload at
most 8MiB. The reason is obvious. The Enron test set consists of tens of thousands of small ASCII files
with each file only consisting of a few bytes but each file occupies a integral multiple of the block size.
In our scenario this creates a huge fragmentation. However, our findings are consistent with Naveed,
Prabhakaran, and Gunter. As our block size is 16 times larger than theirs the possible maximum size of
the total upload is expected to be smaller by the same factor.
The results are depicted in Table 3.
9.5 Test 3: Searching
Similar to Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter we also search for the keyword “the” in the uploaded Enron
dataset. However, Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter state that they did not count the time needed to
handle the lazy delete strategy but we did. The lazy delete strategy is essential for the security of the
scheme and comes with significant costs.
Without this strategy searching for a specific keyword is merely downloading the corresponding index
file. This simplified task is extremely fast but the result of the search may be incorrect. Whenever a file
is modified (or deleted) it is added to all index files for each keyword it contains after the modification
(n.b.: in case of deletion the file is added to no index, because the file is essentially empty after deletion).
This implies that each index may list a file multiple times if old versions of the same file also contained
the same keyword. Moreover, a file might be listed although it does not contain the keyword anymore
but an outdated version of the same file did. The latter also holds if the file was deleted. In order to get
rid of those “phantom” entries each entry in the index is accompanied with a hash of the file content.
Upon searching for a keyword the stored hash is compared to the hash of the current file content and if
they di↵er the entry is considered outdated and removed from the search result. Moreover, the outdated
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Total net size of files (MiB) 1 2 4
Total number of files 214 421 1267
Number of results 156 348 1020
Total execution time (ms) 97 186 435
Table 4: Results of test 3: Searching for the keyword “the”
entry is removed from the index and the revised index is written back to the server. In order to be
able to compare the stored hashes with the current hash the first block of each file in the search result
must be downloaded from the server (via the Blind Storage Scheme) and locally decrypted. Even worse,
downloading a file also implies to upload a fresh re-encryption of the file such that the server cannot
distinguish between a read and a write access.
In summary, skipping the lazy deletion strategy does not reflect what would actually happen if the
scheme was deployed in practice. Hence, we argue that taking the time of the lazy deletion strategy into
account is the right way to measure the performance.
The results are depicted in 4. Our findings indicate an execution time that is slower than [23] by a
factor of approximately 90. This is expected because much time is spent in performing the consistency
checks due to the lazy deletion strategy.
9.6 Summary of the Implementation Report
We implemented the searchable encryption scheme via Blind Storage of Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter
and tried to reproduce their performance results, and also to experiment with its performance in practical
situations. Unfortunately, we cannot deny that – despite all improvements over previous schemes – this
scheme is still far away from being practically useful. Basically, this is due to two reasons.
The first reason can be traced back to latencies within the network IO. The security of the scheme
stems from the fact that an individual file is randomly scattered across many small chunks of data that
needs to be transferred between the client and the server. Actually, this is the same problem that oblivious
RAM (ORAM) also su↵ers from.
The second reason is that the scheme is highly wasteful in space. Both our test scenario and the
scenario of Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter used a blind storage with a net size of 1GB but with
di↵erent block sizes. Due to a 16 times smaller block size Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter were able to
upload 256MB into the blind storage. But this blind storage requires 34GB of space on the underlying
filesystem. Taking both factors together yields an overhead by a factor of 136. We used a much greater
block size that better matched the underlying file system. Thus the gross usage was 1.01GiB. However,
we only could upload 8MiB into the blind storage system. This yields a factor of 130. Either way both
overhead factors are far away from being practical, because allocating two magnitudes more space than
required is not e cient.
10 Conclusion
Cloud storage and computing is growing exponentially due to its cost-e↵ectiveness, but it brings with it
new security concerns. On the one hand, one wants to develop solutions that protect the clients data
from the cloud; on the other hand, one wants to decrease the clients’ functionality as less as possible.
Dynamic searchable encryption schemes can be very useful in this context and indeed we have seen a
lot of theoretical progress in this area in the last two years. Given that fact, we first performed an
extensive survey of the literature of searchable encryption in order to determine the schemes that look
more appropriate for integration with cloud solutions. The scheme Naveed et al. [23] stand out since it
views the cloud as a simple storage service. Hence we proceed with an implementation of that scheme and
performed experiments in order to determine its practicality for real applications. Unfortunately, despite
all theoretical progress presented by that scheme, it is still not practical enough for deployment in most
real applications. Perhaps, other state of the art dynamic searchable encryption schemes which involve
more interaction in the cloud side can prove to be more ready for deployment in real systems (but we fear
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that they can also be not practical enough for deployment). All in all, searchable encryption has a lot of
potential for increasing the security of cloud solutions, therefore a very interesting research direction is
to further research in that area in order to obtain more practical solutions that can be deployed in real
applications.
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